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11.1 Introduction
In all major industrialized countries the population is aging, over time
reducing the fraction of the population in working age. This process is
driven by falling mortality rates followed by a decline in birth rates. This
reduces population growth rates; in some countries, population will even
decline. While demographic change occurs in all countries in the world, ex-
tent and timing diﬀer substantially. Europe and some Asian countries have
almost passed the closing stages of the demographic transition process,
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ter in Woodstock, Vermont.while Latin America and Africa are only at the beginning (Bloom and
Williamson 1998; United Nations 2002).
Figure 11.1, based on United Nations (UN) population projections
(United Nations 2002), illustrates the diﬀerential impact of demographic
change on population growth rates for the period 2000 to 2080. They are
deﬁned as the growth rate of the adult population, aggregated into four
mutually exclusive regions of the world: the United States, the European
Union (EU), the rest of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD [ROECD]) and the rest of the world (ROW).
Population growth rates are predicted to decline in all regions, but to re-
main positive in the United States and in the ROW region throughout the
twenty-ﬁrst century. In contrast, they will become negative in the EU by
about 2016 and in the ROECD by about 2042, such that their populations
start shrinking, while the populations of the other two world regions con-
tinue to grow.
These striking diﬀerences in demographic change will change the global
balance and induce diﬀerential factor price changes and international
ﬂows of labor, capital, and products. All this will aﬀect the welfare of the
people living in these regions. This is the topic of this chapter. As we will see,
welfare is aﬀected diﬀerentially not only across regions but also across gen-
erations.
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Fig. 11.1 Evolution of the population growth rate in 4 regionsFigure 11.2 shows the impact of demographic change on working-age
population ratios—the ratio of the working-age population (of age twenty
to sixty-four) to the total adult population (of age twenty to ninety-ﬁve).
This indicator, which will turn out to be crucial in our analysis, illustrates
that the EU is the oldest, whereas the ROW is the youngest region in terms
of the relative size of the working-age population. The United States and
the rest of the OECD region initially have the same level of working-age
population ratios, but the dynamics of demographic change diﬀer sub-
stantially in the United States relative to the other regions. While working-
age population ratios decrease across all regions, the speed of this decrease
signiﬁcantly slows down for the United States in about 2030.
The chapter continues a line of research by Börsch-Supan (1996);
Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2002, 2006); and, especially, Krüger
and Ludwig (2007) that aim to quantify the eﬀects of demographic change
on macroeconomic developments and welfare. What are the eﬀects of these
long-run developments on relative factor prices and welfare? What are the
additional eﬀects of ongoing pension reforms that convert the pay-as-you-
go (PAYGO) pension systems into multipillar systems with potentially
large capital stocks?
The basic eﬀects are intuitive: ﬁrst, the changes in the population struc-
ture will alter aggregate labor supply and aggregate savings. This will change
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Fig. 11.2 Evolution of working age to population ratios in 4 regionsfactor prices for labor and capital. Because labor will become scarcer, rel-
ative to capital, real wages will increase and real rates of return to capital
will decrease. Second, if countries reform their PAYGO pension systems,
the additional supply of capital increases the downward pressure on the
rates of return. This will have diﬀerential eﬀects on the welfare of genera-
tions. The young may gain through higher wages, while the old may lose
due to lower capital returns.
While these basic mechanisms are intuitive, their quantiﬁcation is diﬃ-
cult, especially in an international context. Quantiﬁcation, however, is im-
portant in order to understand the implications for Social Security reform.
If capital returns decline very little, welfare implications will also be small.
If returns decline catastrophically, like suggested by some proponents of
the so-called asset meltdown hypothesis, pension reforms, that substitute
parts of the PAYGO Social Security system by prefunded accounts, may
create large welfare losses for future pensioners.
This chapter feeds the demographic projections by the United Nations
into a computable overlapping generations model of the type pioneered by
Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987). We extend the model to a multicountry
version as in Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2006) and enrich the
model by uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty, as in I ˙mrohorog ˘lu, I ˙mro-
horog ˘lu, and Joines (1995, 1999); Conesa and Krüger (1999); and Krüger
and Ludwig (2007).
Both extensions are indispensable for the welfare questions we want to
address. First, employing a multicountry view is essential as capital mar-
kets are global and populations age diﬀerentially; for instance, the coun-
tries that supply capital to the United States age faster than the United
States. In our model, capital can freely ﬂow between diﬀerent regions in the
OECD (the United States, the EU and the rest of the OECD). These capi-
tal ﬂows may mitigate the decline in rates of return and the increase in real
wages from the perspective of fast-aging economies such as the European
countries.
Second, uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty will endogenously give
rise to some individuals deriving most of their income from returns to cap-
ital, while the income of others is mainly composed of labor income. Ab-
stracting from this heterogeneity does not allow a meaningful analysis of
the distributional consequences of aging-induced changes in factor prices.
This model feature also adds a precautionary savings motive to the stan-
dard life-cycle savings motive of households, which makes life-cycle sav-
ings proﬁles generated by the model more realistic.
We ﬁnd that the rate of return to capital decreases by roughly 80 to 90
basis points if capital is allowed to freely ﬂow across regions. Our simula-
tions indicate that capital ﬂows from rapidly aging regions to the rest of the
world will initially be substantial but that trends are reversed when house-
holds decumulate savings. However, due to the high correlation of long-
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in the working-age population ratio, compare ﬁgure 11.2, these capital
ﬂows do not aﬀect much the long-run decrease of the rate of return. The
latter does not change much whether we assume the United States (or Eu-
rope) to be closed or open economies.
In order to evaluate the welfare consequences of the demographic tran-
sition, we ask the following question: suppose a household economically
born in 2005 would live through the economic transition with changing
factor prices induced by the demographic change (but keeping its own
survival probabilities constant at their 2005 values); how would its wel-
fare have changed, relative to a situation without a demographic transi-
tion? We ﬁnd that for young households with little assets, the increase in
wages dominates the decline in rates of return. Abstracting from Social
Security and its reform, newborns in 2005 gain in the order of 0.6 to 0.9
percent in terms of lifetime consumption. Older, asset-rich individuals,
on the other hand, tend to lose because of the decline in interest rates. If
the demographic transition, in addition, makes a reform of the Social Se-
curity system necessary, then falling beneﬁts or increasing taxes reduce
the welfare gains for newborn individuals. An increase in the retirement
age to seventy, on the other hand, mitigates some of these negative con-
sequences.
Our chapter borrows model elements from, and contributes to, three
strands of the literature. Starting with Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987), a
vast number of papers has used large-scale overlapping generations (OLG)
models to analyze the transition path of an economy induced by a pol-
icy reform. Examples include Social Security reform (see, e.g., Conesa
and Krüger 1999) and fundamental tax reform (see, e.g., Altig et al. 2001;
Conesa and Krüger 2006).
A second strand of the literature (often using the general methodology
of the ﬁrst strand) has focused on the economic consequences of popula-
tion aging in closed economies, often paying special attention to the ad-
justments required in the Social Security system due to demographic shifts.
Important examples include Huang, I ˙mrohorog ˘lu, and Sargent (1997), De
Nardi, I ˙mrohorog ˘lu, and Sargent (1999), and, with respect to asset prices,
Abel (2003).
The contributions discussed so far assume that the economy under in-
vestigation is closed to international capital ﬂows. However, as the popu-
lation ages at diﬀerent pace in various regions of the world, one would ex-
pect capital to ﬂow across these regions. The third strand of the literature
our chapter touches upon, therefore, is the large body of work in interna-
tional macroeconomics studying the direction, size, cause, and conse-
quences of international capital ﬂows and current account dynamics, re-
viewed comprehensively in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995).
Our chapter is most closely related to work that combines these three
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models to study the consequences of demographic change in open econ-
omies. The work by Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante (2006, 2007) construct
a two-region (the North and the South) OLG model to study the allocative
and welfare consequences of diﬀerent Social Security reforms in an open
economy. Compared to their model, we include endogenous labor supply
and idiosyncratic income shocks.
Similar to our own work, Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoﬀ (2005) investigate
the impact of population aging on the viability of the Social Security sys-
tem and its reform. Building on earlier work by Brooks (2003), who em-
ploys a simple four-period OLG model, Henriksen (2002), Feroli (2003),
and Domeij and Floden (2006) use large-scale simulation models similar
to Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2006) to explain historical capital
ﬂow data with changes in demographics, rather than, as we do, to study the
welfare and distributional implications of futurechanges in demographics.
Relative to this literature, we see the contribution of our chapter in evalu-
ating the welfare consequences of the demographic transition per se and
not just the alternative Social Security reform scenarios, as well as in the
analysis of the distributional consequences of changing factor prices due
to population aging.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 11.2 presents a simple two-
period OLG model to illustrate the relationship between demographic
change, per capita consumption, and welfare. Section 11.3 contains the de-
scription of our large-scale quantitative simulation model, and section 11.4
presents our main results. Finally, section 11.5 concludes.
11.2 A Simple Model
Key for understanding the results in section 11.4 is to notice that per
capita consumption and individual welfare are entirely diﬀerent concepts
in OLG economies. Per capita consumption and output are cross-sectional
measures referring to all households currently alive, whereas welfare is a
cohort-based measure. Relevant for utility over the life cycle are wages, in-
terest rates, and how consumption and leisure are weighted at diﬀerent
ages. Due to discounting, utility from future consumption is lower than
from current consumption, giving more weight to consumption and leisure
at young ages.
As societies are aging, labor becomes relatively scarce and capital rela-
tively abundant, which leads to increases of wages and decreases in rates of
return. This implies that the consumption proﬁle is tilted over the life cycle
such that the young consume relatively more than the old. In per capita
consumption, allocations are weighted with cohort sizes. Hence, as a con-
sequence of demographic change, the size of those who consume more—
the young—decreases, whereas the size of those who consume less—the
390 Alexander Ludwig, Dirk Krüger, and Axel Börsch-Supanold—increases. If this compositional eﬀect is stronger than the direct eﬀect
of a decrease in size of the overall population, per capita consumption de-
creases.
However, if the higher consumption at young ages has a higher utility
weight than the lower consumption at older ages, individual welfare in-
creases. This leads to a result that is counterintuitive at ﬁrst sight: per
capita consumption and welfare may move into diﬀerent directions. De-
mographic change leads to a reduction of per capita consumption, yet, at
the same time, it also leads to an increase of the newborns’ lifetime welfare,
at least in the absence of Social Security.
We now illustrate these insights using a simpliﬁed version of the Dia-
mond (1965) model. Krüger and Ludwig (2007) develop an open-economy
version of the model with Social Security in order to illustrate the various
interactions between demographic change, Social Security and interna-
tional capital ﬂows. Here, we do not address all these issues and focus on a
closed economy without Social Security. We also abstract from technolog-
ical progress.1
11.2.1 Households
There are Nt young households who live for two periods and have pref-
erences over consumption ct
y, co
t 1 representable by the utility function
log(ct
y)      log(co
t 1).
In the ﬁrst period of their lives, households work for a wage wt, and in the
second period, they retire. Because we ignore Social Security, the budget
constraints read as
ct
y   st   wt
co
t 1   (1   rt 1)st,
where rt 1 is the real interest rate between period t and t   1.
11.2.2 Firms
The production function is given by
Yt   Kt
 Nt
1  ,
where Yt is output, and Kt is the aggregate capital stock.
The production technology is operated by a representative ﬁrm that be-
haves competitively in product and factor markets. Assuming that capital
depreciates fully after its use in production, proﬁt maximization of ﬁrms
implies that
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1. These results on per capita consumption and welfare also hold in an open-economy
model where relative prices are driven by the impact of the countries’ relative sizes; see Krüger
and Ludwig (2007) for more details.1   rt   kt
  1




is the capital intensity.
11.2.3 Aggregation
Market clearing requires that
Kt 1   Ntst,
from which we also have that
kt 1   ,
where  t
N is the gross growth rate of the young cohort between periods t –
1 and t. It also measures the working age to population ratio (the higher is
 t
N, the higher is that ratio), which allows us to map the predictions of this
model to the data plotted in ﬁgure 11.2.2
Equilibrium in this model can be characterized analytically. To do so, we
ﬁrst solve the household problem and then aggregate across households.
Optimal savings of the young are given as
st   wt.
Substituting out for wages from the preceding gives
st   kt
 .
From the capital market clearing condition, we now get that
 (1    )
 
1   
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2. The population at time t is given by P t   Nt   Nt–1 and the working age to population ra-
tio is given by
,
which we can rewrite as
.
Thus,  t




1   1/ t
N
Nt   
Nt   Nt 1kt 1   kt
 .
In the steady state, we have that  t
N    N and kt 1   kt   k∗, where k∗ is
the steady-state capital stock given by
k∗    
1/(1  )
where   (1 –  ) /(1    ).
11.2.4 Analysis
Steady-state consumption when young and old can now be written as
cy   k 
co      k  1cy.
From the utility function, we can then derive that
u   ln(cy)      ln(co)
    ln  N,
where   is some constant term that is independent of the exogenous vari-
able  N.
It now immediately follows that utility decreases in  N (or increases in
ln k) if and only if
 (1    )    (1    )   0
⇔    .
Notice that this is just the same condition as requiring the economy to be
dynamically eﬃcient because the golden rule capital stock maximizing per
capita consumption is given by
k∗∗    
1/(1  )
,
that is, if   (1 –  ) /(1    ) then k∗∗   k∗.
We, therefore, have the result that in a dynamically eﬃcient economy,




(1    ) 
 
1   
[ (1    )    (1    )]
   
1   
1   
 




(1    ) 
  
(1    ) N
t 1
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3. These results are reminiscent of the serendipity theorem of Samuelson (1975); see also
Michel and Pestieau (1993) as well as Jaeger and Kuhle (2007).we cannot conclude that decreases of the population growth rate lead to in-
creases in per capita consumption because a decrease of  N leads to an in-
crease of k∗∗ and k∗.
To clarify this, we now derive analytic expressions for per capita output
and consumption. Let P be total population. Notice that we can write
steady-state per capita output as
   .
Using the equilibrium for the steady-state capital intensity, we can rewrite
this expression as
    /(1  ) N [ /(1  )] .
We, therefore, have that
    /(1  ) N [ /(1  )]      .
That is, per capita output increases in  N if and only if
   ,
which becomes less strong as  N is smaller (that is, in economies with a
shrinking population).
As for per capita consumption, we have that
 
 
  (1       1)   /(1  ) N [ /(1  )] ,
which, apart from the constant, has the same form as the equation for per
capita output. Therefore, the same condition as before applies (which is
due to the fact that the saving rate is constant in this simple model).
We can summarize these ﬁndings as follows: starting from an initial
steady state, then if  Nfalls we have—in the new steady-state that the econ-
omy converges to—that (1) welfare of newborns is unambiguously higher
if the economy is dynamically eﬃcient, that is, if   (1 –  ) /(1    ) and
(2) per capita output and consumption are lower than in the initial steady
state if   1/(2    N).
 N
 
1    N
1   
 
1   
cyNo( N      k  1)
   
N 0( N   1)
cyNy   coNo
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The quantitative model we use to evaluate the consequences of demo-
graphic changes for international capital ﬂows, returns to capital and
wages, as well as the welfare consequences emanating from these changes
is the same as in Krüger and Ludwig (2007). We focus on the industrialized
world decomposed into three regions: the United States, the European
Union (EU), and the rest of the OECD (ROECD).
We can think of our simulation model as an engine for the following
thought experiment: we allow country-speciﬁc survival, fertility, and mi-
gration rates to change over time, inducing a demographic transition. In-
duced by the transition of the population structure is a transition path of
the economies of the model, both in terms of aggregate variables as well as
cross-sectional distributions of wealth and welfare. Summary measures of
these changes will provide us with answers as to how the changes in the de-
mographic structure of the economy, by changing returns to capital and
wages, impact the distribution of welfare. Eventually, given by the as-
sumption of a stable demography in the very far future, the economies will
reach a steady state that permits the computation of the transition paths.
Speciﬁcally, we start computations in year 1950 assuming an artiﬁcial
initial steady state. We then use data for a calibration period, 1950 to 2004,
to determine several structural model parameters. We then compute the
model equilibrium from 1950 to 2050, the transition path of interest, and
further onward until the new steady state is assumed in 2300, far into the
future.4
11.3.1 Demographics
The demographic evolution in our model is taken as exogenous.5It is the
main driving force of our model in addition to the design of the Social Se-
curity system; see section 11.3.4. Households start their economic life at
age twenty, retire at age sixty-ﬁve, and live at most until age ninety-ﬁve.
Because we do not model childhood of a household explicitly, we denote
its twentieth year of life by j   0, its retirement age by jr   45, and the
terminal age of life by J   75. Households face an idiosyncratic, time- and
country-dependent (conditional) probability to survive from age j to age 
j   1, which we denote by st,j,i.
For each country i, we have data or forecasts for populations of model
age j   {0, . . . ,75} in years 1950, . . . ,2300. From now on, we denote year
1950 as our base year t 0, and year 2300 as the ﬁnal period T, and the de-
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4. The steady-state year of 2300 is chosen far into the future in order to avoid any contam-
ination of the transition path between 2005 and 2050.
5. While the UN demographic forecasts include a projection of future fertility rates, mor-
tality rates, and migration ﬂows, these projections are not modiﬁed by our model output.mographic data for periods t   {0, . . . ,T} by Nt,j,i. For simplicity, we as-
sume that all migration takes place at or before age j   0 in the model (age
twenty in the data), so that we can treat migrants and individuals born in-
side the country of interest symmetrically.
11.3.2 Technology
In each country, the single consumption good is being produced ac-
cording to a standard neoclassical production function
Yt,i = ZiKα
t,i(AtLt,i)1-α,
where Y t,j is output in country i at date t, Kt,j and Lt,j are capital and labor
inputs, and At is total labor productivity, growing at a constant country in-
dependent rate g. The scaling parameters Zi control relative total factor
productivities across countries, whereas the parameter αmeasures the cap-
ital share and is assumed to be constant over time and across countries. In
each country, capital used in production depreciates at a common rate δ.
Because production takes place with a constant returns to scale production
function and because we assume perfect competition, the number of ﬁrms
is indeterminate in equilibrium and, without loss of generality, we assume
that a single representative ﬁrm operates within each country.
11.3.3 Endowments and Preferences
Households value consumption and leisure over the life cycle according




β ju(cj, 1 - lj) ,
where β is the raw time discount factor, and expectations are taken over
idiosyncratic mortality shocks and stochastic labor productivity. In partic-
ular, the expectations operator E encompasses the survival probabili-
ties st,j,i.
We assume that the per-period utility function is a standard nested con-
stant relative risk aversion (CRRA)-Cobb-Douglas function given by
u(cj, 1   1j)   [cj
 (1   1j)1  ],
where   is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion—the inverse of the inter-
temporal substitution elasticity—and   is the consumption share param-
eter.
Households are heterogeneous with respect to age, a deterministic earn-
ings potential, and stochastic labor productivity. These sources of hetero-




1   
396 Alexander Ludwig, Dirk Krüger, and Axel Börsch-SupanFirst, households’ labor productivity diﬀers according to their age: εjde-
notes average age-speciﬁc productivity of cohort j. Second, each house-
hold belongs to a particular group k   {1, . . . ,K} that shares the same
average productivity  k. Diﬀerences in groups stand in for diﬀerences in
education or ability, characteristics that are ﬁxed at entry into the labor
market and aﬀect a group’s relative wage. We introduce these diﬀerences in
order to generate part of the cross-sectional income and, thus, wealth dis-
persion that does not come from our last source of heterogeneity, idio-
syncratic productivity shocks. Last, a household’s labor productivity is
aﬀected by an idiosyncratic shock,     {1, . . . ,E}, that follows a time-
invariant Markov chain with transition probabilities
 kεj .
We denote by Π the unique invariant distribution associated with  .
11.3.4 Government Policies
Key government policy in, and the second exogenous driving force of,
our model is pension policy. The main ingredients are country-speciﬁc
PAYGO public pension systems whose taxes and beneﬁts will adjust to the
demographic changes in each country. On the revenue side, households pay
a ﬂat payroll tax rate,  t,i, on their labor earnings. Retired households re-
ceive beneﬁts, bt,k,i, that are assumed to depend on the household type,  k,
but are independent of the history of idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
Social Security beneﬁts are, therefore, given by
bt,k,i    t,i k(1    t,i)wt,i,
where  t,i is the pension system’s net replacement rate.
We assume that the budget of the pension system is balanced at all times
such that taxes and beneﬁts are related by





where Nt,j,k,idenotes the population in country iat time tof age jand typek.
In order to shed light on the interaction between the implications of
demographic change and the type of Social Security system, we apply
four diﬀerent scenarios for the future evolution of the Social Security 
system:
• Scenario 1 models a deﬁned contribution PAYGO system in which
taxes are held constant, and replacement rates adjust according to the
demographic change.
• Scenario 2 models a deﬁned beneﬁt PAYGO system in which replace-
ment rates are held constant, and taxes adjust according to the demo-
graphic change.
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dition, adjusts beneﬁts, if needed, to assure budget balance.
• Finally, as a benchmark, our fourth scenario has no PAYGO system
altogether such that all old-age provision is done via private savings
modeled by the life-cycle saving and consumption decisions of the
households.
In addition to its role as governor of the Social Security system, the gov-
ernment also distributes accidental bequests left by those households who
die before age J. It collects their assets and redistributes them in a lump-
sum fashion among the remaining citizens of the country.
11.3.5 Market Structure
In each period, there are spot markets for the consumption good, for la-
bor, and for capital services. While the labor market is a national market
where labor demand and labor supply are equalized country by country,
the markets for the consumption good and capital services are interna-
tional where goods and capital ﬂow freely, and without any transaction
costs, between countries. The supply of capital for production stems from
households in all countries who purchase these assets in order to save for
retirement and to smooth idiosyncratic productivity shocks. As sensitivity
analysis, we explore how countries would be aﬀected by their demographic
changes if they were closed economies where capital stocks and accumu-
lated assets coincide by deﬁnition.
11.3.6 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium in this economy is deﬁned by sequences of in-
dividual decision functions, sequences of production plans for ﬁrms, se-
quences of policies by the government, prices, transfers, and cross-
sectional measures such that (1) households and ﬁrms behave optimally,
(2) the government budget constraint holds, and (3) aggregation condi-
tions hold and (4) markets clear. A stationary equilibrium is a competitive
equilibrium in which all individual functions are constant over time and all
aggregate variables grow at a constant rate. A formal deﬁnition of equilib-
rium is given in Krüger and Ludwig (2007).
11.3.7 Calibration
Calibration of the model is based on the minimum-distance method de-
veloped in Ludwig (2005). Tables 11.1 and 11.2summarize the information
on the values of technology and preference parameters, respectively. No-
tice that some of these parameters are restricted to be identical across
regions, while others are allowed to diﬀer. In particular, total factor pro-
ductivities,  Zi, are scaled such as to match labor productivities and
consumption share parameters,  i, are determined such as to match hours
worked in the three regions of our model.
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sources. For the United States, we calculate Social Security contribution
rates from National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data taken
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) table 3.6. For the other
world regions, we proxy the time path of Social Security contribution rates
by using time path information on total labor costs taken from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) and scale these data by the social security contri-
bution rates reported by the OECD. Using these contribution rates and the
demographic data, we back out replacement rates by the PAYGO budget
constraint.
11.3.8 Solution Method
For given structural model parameters, we solve for the equilibrium of
the model in separate outer and inner loop iterations. Throughout, we take
as length of the period one year. Outer loop iterations search for equilib-
rium interest rates, contribution rates, and accidental bequests using a
modiﬁcation of the familiar Gauss-Seidel algorithm (see Ludwig 2007).
Recursive methods are used to solve the household model in inner loop it-
erations, which are described in detail in Krüger and Ludwig (2007).
11.4 Results
In order to isolate the direct eﬀects of demographic changes on returns
to capital, international capital ﬂows, and the distribution of wealth and
welfare, we ﬁrst abstract from Social Security in our analyses of sections
11.4.1 through 11.4.3. In section 11.4.4, we quantify the additional eﬀects
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Table 11.1 Technology parameters
Parameter United States European Union ROECD
Capital share α 0.33
Growth rate of technology g 0.018
Depreciation rate δ 0.04
Total factor productivity Zi 1.0 0.88 0.65
Note: ROECD   rest of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Table 11.2 Preference parameters
Parameter United States European Union ROECD
Coeﬃcient of RRA σ 1.0
Time discount factor β 0.9378
Consumption share parameter ωi 0.463 0.446 0.442
Note: ROECD   rest of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development;
RRA   relative risk aversion.400 Alexander Ludwig, Dirk Krüger, and Axel Börsch-Supan
Fig. 11.3 Evolution of world interest rates
that are implied by the adjustments of Social Security parameters to de-
mographic change.
One element that distinguishes our model from the earlier work in
Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2006) is idiosyncratic risk. This en-
ables us to characterize the distributional consequences of demographic
change in a more realistic setting. In section 11.4.5, we address its implica-
tions for the general equilibrium rates of return and wages as well as for
welfare. Throughout, we assume that capital ﬂows freely between regions
in the OECD.
11.4.1 Dynamics of Aggregate Statistics
In ﬁgure 11.3, we display the evolution of the real return to capital from
2000 to 2080. In the same ﬁgure, we plot, as a summary measure of the age
structure of the population, the fraction of the world adult population with
age above sixty-ﬁve (by assumption these individuals are retired in our
model); this statistic is one minus the working age to population ratio. We
observe that the rate of worldwide return to capital is predicted to fall by
almost 1 percentage point in the next sixty years and then to settle down at
that lower level.
Pretax wages are related to the interest rate by
wt,i   (1    )ZiAt  
 /(1  )
and, thus, detrended (by productivity growth) real wages follow exactly the
inverse path of interest rates, documented in ﬁgure 11.3. These detrended
wages are predicted to increase by roughly 4 percent between 2000 and
2050 in all regions in our model.
 Zi  
rt   In ﬁgure 11.4, we plot the evolution of detrended output per capita in the
three regions, normalized to 1 in the year 2000. Notice that per capita here
refers to the adult population aged twenty to ninety-ﬁve. We observe sub-
stantial declines of 7 to 13 percent in the three regions. The decline is least
pronounced in the United States because there the decrease of the fraction
of households in working age is more modest after 2030, as we saw in ﬁgure
11.2. During the transition period from 2005 to 2050, the negative eﬀects of
decreasing working age to population ratios, therefore, dominate the posi-
tive eﬀects on output per worker (see the discussion in section 11.2).
11.4.2 Quantifying International Capital Flows
In order to analyze the direction and size of international capital ﬂows,
we will document the evolution of the net foreign asset position and the
current account of the countries/regions under consideration. The current
account is given by the change in the net foreign asset position and, thus,
by the diﬀerence of country i’s saving and investment.6
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6. Note that in a closed economy, F t,i   Ct,i   0, and that in a balanced growth path of an
open economy, CAt,i   g(At,i   Kt,i) Furthermore, net asset positions and current accounts
evidently have to sum to zero across regions:
∑
i
F t,i  ∑
i
CAt,i   0 for all t.CAt,i   Ft 1,i   Ft,i
  St,i   It,i.
When reporting these statistics, we always divide them by output Yt,i. We
start with investigating national saving and investment rates and then dis-
cuss the implied current account and net foreign asset positions.
The most direct eﬀect of an aging population is that labor, as a factor of
production, becomes scarce. As a result, for unchanged aggregate saving,
the return to capital has to fall and gross wages have to rise. This is what we
observe in ﬁgure 11.3. However, the decline in interest rates may reduce the
incentives of households to save, depending on the relative size of the in-
come and substitution eﬀect. In addition, with the aging of society, the age
composition of the population shifts toward older households who are dis-
savers in our life-cycle model. Consequently, savings rates in all regions in
our model decline over time. For the next twenty years, the fall in savings
rates is most pronounced for the United States because there, during this
time period, the large cohort of baby boomers moves into retirement. The
same is true for other regions of the world, albeit to a lesser degree on av-
erage.7 After the large cohort of baby boomers have left the economy (i.e.,
died), the U.S. saving rate is predicted to rebound (in about twenty-ﬁve to
thirty-ﬁve years) and then to stabilize, whereas in the EU and the rest of the
OECD, savings rates continue to fall until about 2040 and then stabilize.
The other side of the medal (that is, of the current account) is the invest-
ment behavior in the diﬀerent regions. Given that savings rates decline
globally due to population aging, investment rates have to do so as well, on
average, because the world current account has to balance to zero. As the
population ages and the labor force declines, it is optimal to reduce the
capital stock with which these fewer workers work. Thus investment rates
fall. This fall is by far the least pronounced for the United States. Further-
more, in the United States, the investment rate stops falling by about 2020,
roughly a decade earlier than its saving rate. This is due to the fact that the
fall in the working age to population ratio is completed around that date in
the United States. On the other hand, in the EU and the rest of the OECD,
this ratio continues to fall until 2035. Because capital- (eﬀective) labor ra-
tios have to be equalized, capital allocated to these regions has to fall (rel-
ative to the United States) and so do investment rates in these regions.
Figure 11.5 shows the current account to output ratios resulting from
these dynamics of saving and investment rates. It depicts a clear deteriora-
tion of the U.S. current account of about 2 percent of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) that is expected to occur in the next thirty years as capital ﬂows
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7. Notice that the evolution of demographic variables and the simulated time paths of sav-
ings may diﬀer substantially across the countries within each country block; see, for example,
Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2006).from the EU and, with a slight time delay, from the rest of the OECD, into
the United States. By 2040, this process is completed, and the current ac-
count of all countries returns to roughly zero from that point on. The pre-
dicted deterioration in the U.S. current account is due to an investment rate
that falls less than in other countries (because the population in the United
States ages slower and, thus, the labor force falls less) as well as a (tempo-
rary) sharp decline in the U.S. savings rate in the next twenty years due to
the gradual retirement of the baby boomers.
11.4.3 Distributional and Welfare Consequences
of Demographic Change
In the previous sections, we have documented substantial changes in fac-
tor prices induced by the aging of the population, amounting to a decline
of about 1 percentage point in real returns to capital and an increase in
gross wages of about 4 percent in the next decades. In this section, we want
to quantify the distributional and welfare eﬀects emanating from these
changes.
Evolution of Inequality
In ﬁgure 11.6, we display the evolution of income inequality over time in
the three regions. Income is composed of labor income (which later will in-
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Fig. 11.5 Evolution of the current account in 3 regionsclude pension income) and capital income as well as transfers from acci-
dental bequests.
We observe a signiﬁcant increase in income inequality between 2000 and
2080, of about 5 points in the Gini coeﬃcient for the EU and the ROECD
and 3.5 points in the United States. The reason for this increase is mainly a
compositional eﬀect. Retired households have signiﬁcantly lower income,
on average, than households in working age. The demographic transition
toward more retired households, therefore, is bound to increase inequality,
especially in those regions where the increase in the fraction of retired
households among the population is very pronounced. This explains the
more modest increase in income inequality in the United States. Note that
consumption inequality follows income inequality trends fairly closely in
the three regions (and, thus, is not shown here), but increases in consump-
tion inequality are less pronounced. Also notice that the ordering of coun-
tries in the ﬁgure will be reversed once we add pension systems—then, in-
come will be least equally distributed in the United States.
The fact that it is nota rise in capital income inequality that drives the in-
crease in total income inequality becomes clear when plotting wealth in-
equality over time (see ﬁgure 11.7). There is no discernible increase in the
same period; evidently, the same is true for capital income inequality be-
cause capital income is proportional to wealth.
In contrast to income, wealth follows a hump-shaped pattern over the
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Fig. 11.6 Evolution of income inequality in 3 regionslife cycle (on average), with the elderly and the young being wealth-poor.
Thus, in contrast to income inequality, the aging of the population does not
lead to an increase in wealth inequality because the demographic change
increases the fraction of the elderly but reduces the fraction of the young.
Consequently, income and wealth inequality do not follow the same trend
over time, nor is the ranking in inequality across regions the same for in-
come and wealth.
We, therefore, conclude that the opposite general equilibrium eﬀects on
wages and interest rates have little impact on the income and wealth distri-
bution across generations.
Welfare Consequences of the Demographic Transition
A household’s welfare is aﬀected by two consequences of demographic
change. First, her lifetime utility changes because her own survival proba-
bilities increase; this is in part what triggers the aging of the population.
Second, due to the demographic transition, she faces diﬀerent factor prices
and government transfers and taxes (from the Social Security system and
from accidental bequests) than without changes in the demographic struc-
ture. Speciﬁcally, households face a path of declining interest rates and in-
creasing wages, relative to the situation without a demographic transition.
We want to isolate the welfare consequences of the second eﬀect. For this
we compare lifetime utility of individuals born and already alive in 2005
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Fig. 11.7 Evolution of wealth inequality in 3 regionsunder two diﬀerent scenarios. For both scenarios, we ﬁx a household’s in-
dividual survival probabilities at their 2005 values; of course, they fully re-
tain their age-dependence. Then we solve each household’s problem under
two diﬀerent assumptions about factor prices (and later taxes/transfers,
once we have introduced Social Security). Let W  (t, i, j, k,  , a) denote the
lifetime utility of an individual at time t   2005 in country I with individ-
ual characteristics (j, k,  , a) that faces the sequence of equilibrium prices
as documented in the previous section, but constant 2005 survival proba-
bilities, and let W   2005(t, i , j, k,  , a) denote the lifetime utility of the same
individual that faces prices and taxes/transfers that are held constant at
their 2005 value. Finally, denote by g(t, i, j, k,  , a) the percentage increase
in consumption that needs to be given to an individual (t, i, j, k,  , a) at each
date and contingency in his or her remaining lifetime (keeping labor supply
allocations ﬁxed) at ﬁxed prices to make him or her as well oﬀ as under the
situation with changing prices.8Positive numbers of g(t, i, j, k,  , a) thus in-
dicate that households obtain welfare gains from the general equilibrium
eﬀects of the demographic changes; negative numbers mean welfare losses.
Of particular interest are the numbers g(t   56, i, j   0, k,  , a   0), that is,
the welfare consequences for newborn individuals in 2005 (t   56)—re-
member that newborns start their life with zero assets.
Table 11.3 documents these numbers for  -type 1 for the United States,
diﬀerentiated by their productivity shock  . The results for  -type 2 are
nearly identical.9
We make several observations. First, newborn individuals experience
welfare gains from changing factor prices and transfers induced by the de-
mographic transition (compare the discussion in section 11.2). Apart from
changing preferences through higher longevity (an eﬀect we control for
in our welfare calculations), the demographic transition substantially in-
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8. For the Cobb-Douglas utility speciﬁcation for   1, the number g(t, i, j, k,  , a) can eas-
ily be computed as
g(t, i, j, k,  , a)    
1/[ i(1  )]
.
A similar expression holds for   1.
9. The welfare consequences are very similar for other countries. In fact, in the benchmark
model, the only diﬀerence across countries and types stems from accidental bequests, which
are redistributed in a lump-sum fashion and whose dynamics varies slightly across countries.
Because these transfers are small in magnitude, however, so are the cross-country and cross-
type diﬀerences in welfare.
W  (t, i, j, k,  , a)
  
W   2005(t, i, j, k,  , a)
Table 11.3 Welfare consequences, United States—pure demographic eﬀects (%)
Productivity η1 Productivity η2
0.9 0.6creases the real wage over time, reduces the interest rate and ﬁrst increases,
and then (after 2040) somewhat reduces transfers from accidental be-
quests. The eﬀect from changes in transfers is small, at least for newborns.
The dominating eﬀect for newborn individuals is the substantial increase
in wages, partially because these individuals have not yet accumulated as-
sets and, thus, do not suﬀer from a loss of capital income on already accu-
mulated ﬁnancial wealth, in contrast to older households. Of course, a
lower interest rate makes it harder for these households to accumulate as-
sets for retirement. Because borrowing is ruled out the decline in interest
rates alone, therefore, has unambiguously negative consequences for wel-
fare.
Second, individuals born with low productivity will experience some-
what higher welfare gains than individuals that start their working life with
high productivity. Low-productivity individuals expect higher productiv-
ity in the future and, thus, beneﬁt more strongly from the increasing wage
proﬁle induced by the demographic transition than the currently highly
productive, whose productivity is going to fall in expectation.
Given that the welfare impact of changing factor prices constitutes a
trade-oﬀ between increasing wages and falling returns to capital, one
would expect that those members of society for whom labor income con-
stitutes a smaller part of (future) resources than capital income beneﬁt less
from the demographic transition. An advantage of our model with unin-
surable idiosyncratic income shocks and, thus, endogenous intracohort
wealth heterogeneity is that it allows us to document how the welfare con-
sequences are distributed across the population, both across and within co-
horts. Figure 11.8 plots the welfare gains for individuals of age sixty in
2005.
These households have most of their working life behind them and, thus,
are fairly unaﬀected by the wage changes and simply experience lower re-
turns on their accumulated savings. We see that individuals in this cohort
suﬀer welfare losses that increase substantially by the amount of ﬁnancial
assets they have already accumulated. To give a sense of how many indi-
viduals there are at diﬀerent points in the asset distribution, the support of
this distribution for the sixty-year-old ranges roughly to a   12 (about 19
times GDP per capita), with median asset levels around 4 (10) times GDP
per capita for the low  -low (high) type individuals and about 4.1 (10.8)
times GDP per capita for the high  -low (high) type individuals. Overall, a
fraction of 38 percent of individuals economically alive in 2005 gain from
the changing factor prices. These tend to be young individuals with little
assets and currently low labor productivity.
11.4.4 The Role of Social Security
So far, we have abstracted from government policies. An idealized
PAYGO public pension system can respond to an increase in the share of
Demographic Change, Factor Prices, and International Capital Flows 407pensioners in the population by (a combination of) at least three ways: cut-
ting beneﬁts, increasing Social Security contribution rates, or increasing
the retirement age. While a likely response will include all elements, we now
present results for the model with a PAYGO Social Security system that re-
sponds to population aging by either holding tax rates ﬁxed (and, thus, cut-
ting beneﬁts), by holding replacement rates ﬁxed (and thus raising taxes),
or by increasing the retirement age.10
Because of the strong inﬂuence of a public pension system on private
savings behavior, we expect that these diﬀerent reform scenarios may have
substantially diﬀerent implications for the evolution of factor prices and
the size and direction of international capital ﬂows as well as the distribu-
tion of welfare. This conjecture turns out to be correct. Note that for all ex-
ercises we recalibrate production and preference parameters such that
each economy (with the diﬀerent Social Security systems) attains the same
calibration targets for the 1950 to 2004 period.
In table 11.4, we show how the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates
and prices diﬀers across the various scenarios for Social Security. Com-
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Fig. 11.8 Welfare change
10. In our experiment, we increase the mandatory retirement age by ﬁve years in 2005 and
keep contribution rates ﬁxed. When needed, beneﬁts are adjusted to retain budget balance of
the Social Security system.paring the no-Social Security scenario to a world with Social Security in
which payroll tax rates are held constant (and, thus, beneﬁts decline), we
observe that changes in factor prices are roughly the same between the two
scenarios.11 One big diﬀerence, however, is the change in Social Security
beneﬁts required to cope with the demographic transition, which implies a
decline in replacement rates by about 5 percentage points in the scenario
with Social Security. Column (4) demonstrates that keeping pension bene-
ﬁts constant and adjusting taxes, on the other hand, has dramatic conse-
quences for the evolution of interest rates and wages, relative to the bench-
mark scenario of ﬁxing tax rates for Social Security. With ﬁxed beneﬁts,
the incentives to save for retirement are drastically reduced, relative to the
benchmark. In addition, the substantial increase in tax rates of 6 percent-
age points and the corresponding reduction in after tax wages make it
harder to save. Therefore, despite the decline in the fraction of households
in working age (and diminished incentives to work because of higher pay-
roll taxes), now the capital-labor ratio remains roughly unchanged because
of the large reduction of household savings. Consequently, the increase in
wages and decline in returns is much less pronounced in this scenario. Fi-
nally, the last column of table 11.4 shows that an increase in the retirement
age by ﬁve years, while leaving the change in factor prices roughly the same
as in the benchmark, implies a much smaller decline in beneﬁts as with a
retirement age of sixty-ﬁve (see column [3]).12 Because of the expansion in
labor supply, output per capita falls signiﬁcantly less in this scenario than
in all others.
Given these substantial diﬀerences in changes of allocations, it is not sur-
prising that the welfare consequences diﬀer across these two scenarios as
well. Table 11.5 summarizes the welfare losses from the demographic tran-
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Table 11.4 Evolution of aggregates in the United States, 2005–2050 (%)
Variable No Social Security τ ﬁxed ρ ﬁxed Adj. of jr
r  0.86  0.82  0.26  0.79
w 4.1 3.8 1.2 3.6
τ 0 0 5.9 0
ρ 0  7.1 0  3.1
Y/N  5.2  5.2  9.5  3.8
C/N  4.7  4.7  7.4  2.6
11. Remember that we recalibrate our model so that in all scenarios, the pre-2005 equilib-
rium features the same capital-output ratio.
12. A further increase in the retirement age has no substantial eﬀect on labor supply be-
cause households are not very productive beyond age seventy because we do not account for
the eﬀects of improved health on productivity. Consequently, the eﬀects reported in table 11.4
may be biased, and the accompanying welfare consequences of increases in retirement ages
for newborns reported in table 11.5 are at the lower bound.sition for newborns in the United States in 2005.13 We ﬁnd that, because of
the decline in beneﬁts or the increase in taxes, the welfare implications from
the demographic change are less favorable in a world with Social Security
than without. The policy option of keeping beneﬁts constant and letting tax
rates increase implies especially large welfare losses from population aging
for newborns, and even more so for future generations (not shown here). If,
in contrast, the retirement age is increased to age seventy, low-type house-
holds who enter the labor market unproductive are especially beneﬁting.
These households expect productivity to be higher in the future, face in-
creasing wages, and can exploit these longer now as they can work until age
seventy. It is, therefore, this group for which the increase in wages presents
a good opportunity to intertemporally substitute labor supply; conse-
quently, the beneﬁt of being able to work longer and, thus, the overall wel-
fare gains from changing factor prices are largest for this group. For older
individuals, the welfare losses from the demographic transition are signiﬁ-
cantly smaller with an expansion of the retirement age, relative to simply
holding contribution rates ﬁxed and letting beneﬁts decline (results not
shown). Older households are given the option to endogenously respond to
lower beneﬁt levels by expanding their labor supply for ﬁve more years.
Thus, we conclude that the option of increasing the retirement age leads
to less welfare losses (and even welfare gains for some groups) from popu-
lation aging than adjusting taxes or beneﬁts alone.
11.4.5 The Role of Idiosyncratic Risk
We now investigate the role of idiosyncratic risk and ask whether our
quantitative predictions change when we ignore idiosyncratic risk as has
been done in earlier analyses (e.g., Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter
2006). In order to illustrate the interactions between relative price changes
and the insurance role of the pension system, we here take as a benchmark
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Table 11.5 Welfare consequences, newborns in the United States (%)
No Social
Security τ ﬁxed ρ ﬁxed Adj. of jr
Type η1 η2 η1 η2 η1 η2 η1 η2
K1 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.2  1.6  1.8 1.4 0.6
K2 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.0  1.8  1.9 0.8 0.3
13. Note that the numbers of table 11.6 do permit a meaningful welfare comparison of
diﬀerent Social Security reform scenarios to deal with the demographic change. In order to
achieve this comparability in our welfare computations (and in these only), we always use the
same parameters for all scenarios, those calibrated for the no Social Security benchmark. The
table does not, however, permit an assessment as to whether households are better oﬀ in a
world with or without Social Security.scenario a Social Security system with ﬁxed contribution rates. We then re-
calibrate the model such as to meet the same calibration targets on the ag-
gregate level. Because a precautionary savings motive is not at work in an
economy without risk, we have to increase the discount factor by 2 per-
centage points to make households suﬃciently impatient such as to meet
the calibration target of the capital output ratio. Our results for macroeco-
nomic aggregates are summarized in table 11.6. Relative price changes are
stronger in the scenario with risk because hours worked decrease more
strongly and, therefore, Social Security beneﬁts are more strongly reduced.
As a consequence of the interplay of both eﬀects, the capital output ratio
increases by more and, therefore, the relative price eﬀects are slightly
stronger than in the scenario without risk.
Finally, table 11.7 compares the welfare consequences of demographic
change across the two scenarios. In these welfare comparisons, we isolate
the role of idiosyncratic risk by holding preference parameters constant (as
before in table 11.5) and by evaluating the welfare consequences for the
equilibrium prices that resulted from our pure  -ﬁxed scenario. With the
exception of low-type, low-shock households, all households are better oﬀ
in a world without risk. By the mean reverting pattern of our wage pro-
cesses, uncertainty about future wage income represents a chance for low-
type, low-shock households.
11.5 Conclusions
In all major industrialized countries, the population is aging, bringing
with it a potentially large impact on the returns to the production factors
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Table 11.6 U.S. aggregates, 2005–2008—the role of risk (%)
Variable τ ﬁxed τ ﬁxed   no risk
r  0.82  0.75
w 3.8 3.5
τ 00
ρ  7.0  6.3
Y/N  5.2  3.9
C/N  4.7  3.0
Table 11.7 Welfare consequences—the role of risk (%)
τ ﬁxed
Type η1 η2 τ ﬁxed   no risk
K1 0.8 0.2 0.7
K2 0.4 0.0 0.5capital and labor. This chapter reports that the rate of return to capital can
be expected to decrease by about 80 to 90 basis points until 2050, with a
corresponding increase of wages if PAYGO Social Security systems are re-
formed such that contribution rates are held constant. Under such a re-
form, the welfare consequences from population aging through increasing
wages and declining rates of return are positive in the order of up to 1 per-
cent in lifetime consumption for newborns in 2005. This number masks
important distributional shifts: households that have already accumulated
assets lose from the decline in rates of return. As an interesting policy
eﬀect, our chapter also shows that increasing the mandatory retirement
age by ﬁve years is shown to substantially mitigate these losses and to sig-
niﬁcantly increase welfare gains of newborns.
The welfare gains for newborns are actually larger than what we com-
pute because in addition, these newborns are expected to live longer than
the current generation. Similarly, the welfare losses for older asset holders
are smaller because they also have a longer life expectancy. Quantifying the
utility gains from living longer is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Future research will be devoted to several valuable additions. One im-
portant channel of adjustment to a shrinking labor force that we have ab-
stracted from is endogenous human capital accumulation. Higher returns
to human capital in the form of higher wages may make it optimal for young
(and possibly older) households to obtain a better education, increasing the
supply of eﬀective labor. This eﬀect may counteract some of the increase in
the capital-labor ratio and, hence, mitigate the impact of population aging
on factor prices. Another addition will be to diﬀerentiate among asset
types. For example, out-of-life-cycle investment motives one may expect a
stronger decrease of the rate of return on risk free assets and, thus, an in-
crease of the equity premium. Finally, our analysis has focused on open cap-
ital markets within OECD countries, and we thereby did not address the po-
tentially important roles of the upcoming demographic changes in China
and India for international capital ﬂows and welfare from a U.S. perspec-
tive. The literature has not reached a conclusion on the relative importance
of these countries.14 All these issues are left for future research.
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Comment James M. Poterba
This chapter makes an important contribution to the rapidly-growing lit-
erature on the ﬁnancial market consequences of demographic change. It is
both technically sophisticated and substantively important. The technical
innovations include the construction of a multicountry overlapping gener-
ation (OLG) model that is solved under the assumption of perfect foresight
and the careful modeling of uncertainty in the labor income process facing
individuals. Allowing such uncertainty induces both precautionary as well
as life-cycle motives for individual saving, thereby moving beyond many
previous studies that have counterfactually assumed that there are no in-
tergenerational wealth transfers.
The substantively important conclusions in this chapter concern the im-
pact of demographic change on wages, the return to capital, and the pat-
tern of international capital ﬂows. There is broad theoretical consensus on
the direction of change in each of these variables that follows from a decline
in the birth rate and a corresponding increase in average population age.
Yet whether the resulting eﬀects are likely to be large or small is critically
important for a range of issues, including the structure of long-term ﬁscal
policy and the appropriate level of saving by households that are preparing
for retirement. Simulation models are the best way to develop reliable an-
swers to questions about the magnitude of the eﬀects of population aging,
but one always worries that these models may neglect important factors
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